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CASENOTES 
EVIDENCE - MARYLAND ADOPTS THE PRESENT SENSE IM-
PRESSION EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. Booth v. State, 
306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986). 
A man was murdered in his home; I just prior to his death the man 
made two statements to another person over the telephone.2 These state-
ments were the most important evidence linking the defendant to the 
murder. 3 At the trial of the accused, a witness testified to the statements 
made by the decedent.4 The trial judge admitted the statements, as testi-
fied to by the witness, under the present sense impression (PSI) exception 
to the hearsay rule. 5 The court of special appeals held that the PSI is 
a valid exception to the hearsay rule6 and that the statements were cor-
rectly admitted into evidence under the exception.7 The court of appeals 
affirmed and further held that corroboration by an equally percipient wit-
ness is not a requirement for admissibility. 8 
Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement which is offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 9 
Hearsay statements are inadmissible as evidence because the declarant, 
the one who made the statement, was not subject to the credibility safe-
guardslO of oath, II personal presence,12 and cross-examination 13 at the 
1. Booth v. State, 62 Md. App. 26, 29; 488 A.2d 195, 197 (1985) aff'd, 306 Md. 313, 
508 A.2d 976 (1986). 
2.Id. 
3. Brieffor Appellee at 18-19, Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986) (No. 
85-86). 
4. Id. Regina Harrison, the witness, called Ross, the victim, between 5:30 and 6:00 
p.m. on April 4, 1983. During their conversation Harrison heard a female voice in 
the background and asked who it was. Brief for Appellee at 2. Ross told Harrison 
it was a girl he knew named Brenda. Id. He said he was about to make dinner and 
that he was going to ask "Brenda" to leave. At one point in the conversation some-
one knocked on the decedent's front door. /d. at 3. Harrison asked Ross who was 
there and Ross replied that Brenda was talking to some guy on the front steps. Id. 
Harrison testified that she heard the knock at the door and voices in the background 
during the conversation. /d. 
5. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 316, 508 A.2d 976, 977 (1986). 
6. Booth v. State, 62 Md. App. 26,488 A.2d 195, aff'd, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 
(1986). 
7.Id. 
8. Booth, 306 Md. at 331, 508 A.2d at 985. 
9. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (3d 
ed. 1984); see also L. McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801.1 (1987) (the declar-
ant cannot testify to his own out-of-court statement unless an exception applies). 
10. Credibility of testimony depends on four factors: perception, memory, narration 
and sincerity. Each of these can be tested by three safeguards: oath, personal pres-
ence and ability to cross-examine. See FED. R. EVID. 802; C. MCCORMICK, supra 
note 9, § 245. 
11. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 245 (an oath may impress upon a witness an obli-
gation to tell the truth and warn of the danger of criminal sanctions for perjury). 
12. Id. (personal presence eliminates the danger of inaccuracy in reporting the out-of-
court statement). 
13. Id. (giving the opponent an opportunity to cross-examine the witness is the principle 
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time the statement was made. 14 The rule against hearsay, however, is 
subject to many exceptions all of which are justified by the circumstantial 
guarantees of credibility. IS 
One of the exceptions to the rule is the "spontaneous declaration" or 
"spontaneous statement."16 There are four types of spontaneous state-
ments: (1) statements of present bodily conditions, (2) statements of 
present mental states and emotions,17 (3) excited utterances,18 and 
(4) present sense impressions. 19 All of these exceptions were derived 
from the broad concept of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.20 
James Bradley Thayer first formulated the PSI exception in 1881 in 
response to the English case of Regina v. Bedingfield.zt The judge in 
Bedingfield refused to admit hearsay testimony of a witness because the 
statement was made after the event in question, thereby removing the 
statement from the res gestae exception.22 Thayer disagreed with the 
court's ruling. He theorized that a hearsay exception based on contem-
poraneity of statements made by those present at an event and made at or 
near the time the event took place was warranted because these factors 
significantly increased the trustworthiness of the statements.23 Thayer's 
formulation of the PSI has been accepted by the majority of commenta-
tors who have considered the viability and worth of the exception.24 
safeguard; it gives the opponent a chance to clarify points, ask questions, reconcile 
contradictions and remove ambiguities). 
14. See L. McLAIN, supra note 9. 
15. The exceptions fall into two basic categories: (1) those that require the declarant to 
be unavailable, and (2) those that operate whether the declarant is available or not. 
See FED. R. EVID. 803-804. 
16. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, §§ 288-298. 
17. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, §§ 288-296 (discusses present bodily conditions and 
present mental states and emotions). 
18. Id. § 297. 
19. Id. § 298. 
20. Id. §§ 288, 298. The res gestae exception allows hearsay statements that are made 
spontaneously and concurrently with an event or condition to be admitted into evi-
dence because the statements are inherently credible by their spontaneousness. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). Res gestae literally means "things 
done." Id. 
21. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case - Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae (pts. I-III), 14 
AM. L. REV. 817 (1880) (pts. I, II), 15 AM. L. REV. 71 (1881) (pt. III). Bedingfield 
was not officially reported. See Thayer, supra, 14 AM. L. REV. at 817. 
22. Thayer, supra note 21, 14 AM. L. REV. at 818. 
23. Thayer, supra note 21, 15 AM. L. REV. at 83. 
24. See infra notes 25, 37-38; see also United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th 
Cir. 1979); Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 319-20, 508 A.2d 976, 979 (1986); Com-
monwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 116-20,326 A.2d 387, 389-91 (1974); FED. R. 
EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note. But see 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) (Wigmore believed that excited utterances were the only 
spontaneous statements which justified exception to the hearsay rule). One com-
mentator whose work has gained widespread recognition is Professor Morgan. 
Morgan supports the exception for two reasons. First, the perceptions of the declar-
ant are of events existing concurrently with the declarant's statements. Morgan, A 
Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 
236-37 (1922). Second, the contemporaneity requirement usually insures that the 
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The leading American case recognizing the PSI exception is Hous-
ton Oxygen Co. v. Davis.2s In Houston Oxygen, the driver of a car, imme-
diately after another car passed by at a high rate of speed, said, "they 
must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road 
wrecked if they kept that rate of speed Up."26 Shortly thereafter, the 
speeding car collided with a third car a few miles down the road.27 In 
subsequent litigation, the victims of the accident attempted to admit the 
driver's statement into evidence through the testimony of two passengers 
in the car and the driver.28 The trial court held that the statement was 
hearsay and therefore inadmissible.29 On appeal, however, the Supreme 
Court of Texas held that the statement was admissible under the PSI 
exception to the hearsay rule.30 The court stated three reasons that war-
ranted the exception: (1) the contemporaneity between the statement 
and the event insures against defects in memory,3l (2) the contemporane-
ity requirement leaves little or no time for the declarant to fabricate a 
statement,32 and (3) the statement will usually be made to another who 
has an equal chance to observe the event.33 
The authors of the Federal Rules of Evidence also recognized the 
logic of the admission of the PSI and made it an exception to the hearsay 
rule. Federal Rule 803(1) defines the PSI as "[a] statement describing an 
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition, or immediately thereafter."34 The advisory committee note to 
the rule helps to explain its justification.3s The note states that the wit-
event is open to the perception of the witness to the statement and the witness will 
be available for cross-examination on the existence of the event or condition and the 
content of the statement. These safeguards bolster the trustworthiness of the hear-
say, and therefore the statements should be admitted into evidence. See id. 
25. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 298, at 861. 
26. Houston Oxygen, 139 Tex. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476. 
30. [d. 
31. [d. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 477. It is arguable that the facts presented in Houston Oxy-
gen also met the excited utterance criteria because an exciting event occurred. C. 
MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 298, at 861 n.lO. 
32. Houston Oxygen, 139 Tex. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 477. 
33. [d. 
34. FED. R. EVID. 803(1); accord MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 512(a); UNIF. R. 
OF EVID. 803(1). A majority of the states have adopted similar statutes. ALASKA 
R. EVID. 803(1); ARIZ. R. EVID. 803(1); ARK. R. EVID. 803(1); CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1241 (West 1965); COLO. R. EVID. 803(1); FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(1); IDAHO 
R. EVID. 803(1); IOWA R. EVID. 803(1); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-
460(d)(I) (Vernon 1983); ME. R. EVID. 803(1); MONT. R. EVID. 803(1); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 51.085 (1971); N.H. R. EVID. 803(1); N.J. R. EVID. 63(4)(a); N.M. R. 
EVID. 803(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-l, R.803(1) (1986); N.D. R. EVID. 803(1); 
OHIO R. EVID. 803(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(1) (1980); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 19-16-5 (1987); TEX. R. EVID. 803(1); UTAH R. EVID. 803(1); VT. 
R. EVID. 803(1); WASH. R. EVID. 803(1); W. VA. R. EVID. 803(1); WIS. R. EVID. 
908.03(1); WYo. R. EVID. 803(1). 
35. FED: R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note. 
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ness' availability for cross-examination as to the surrounding circum-
stances is an aid in evaluating the statement36 and that the 
contemporaneity requirement37 eliminates opportunities for dec1arants to 
fabricate statements. 38 The committee note further observes that the 
event and the statement do not have to be exactly contemporaneous if the 
time lapse is reasonable under the circumstances. 39 
The Federal Rule and the advisory committee note, however, do not 
address all of the potential problems courts encounter when applying the 
PSI exception.4O In addressing the problems that have arisen from the 
application of the rule, courts have usually agreed on the resolutions.41 
One issue, however, whether corroboration of the event is a requirement 
for admissibility, is not settled.42 
36.Id. 
37. Id. (the requirement that the statement and the event be closely related in time). 
38.Id. 
39. Id. This factor has created few problems in the application of the present sense 
impression exception. See Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the 
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 879-80 (1981). 
Commentators and courts agree that the circumstances of each case must be consid-
ered to determine whether enough time between the event and statement elapsed to 
allow for a conscious misstatement. See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
986 (1977); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 312, 513 A.2d 373, 379 (1986) 
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987); Reichman v. Wallach, 306 Pa. Super. 177,452 
A.2d 501 (1982); c. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 298, at 862; Waltz, supra, at 880. 
Two questionable decisions involving indefinite time periods are United States v. 
Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Starr v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d 183 
(N.D. 1975). See Comment, The Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: An 
Analysis of the Corroboration Requirements, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 666 (1976). 
40. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9; Waltz, supra note 39; Comment, Spontaneous 
Exclamations in the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1940); 
Comment, supra note 39; Note, The Need for a New Approach to the Present Sense 
Impression Hearsay Exception After State v. Flesher, 67 IOWA L. REV. 179 (1981). 
41. One issue is whether the declarant needs to be involved in the event or condition. 
Courts have ruled that he does not, but he must have firsthand knowledge of the 
event or condition. People v. Poland, 22 111. 2d 175, 183, 174 N.E.2d 804, 808 
(1961); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 301 (J. 
Weinstein 5th ed. 1976); Waltz, supra note 39, at 877-78. Another issue is whether 
the declarant's identity must be known. It is generally agreed that the identity of 
the declarant has no bearing on the admissibility of the hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 
803(1); Waltz, supra note 39, at 878-79; Comment, supra note 39, at 676 (This com-
mentator discusses Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939), in which the 
court held that PSI statements were inadmissible because the declarant did not have 
firsthand knowledge of the event. Firsthand knowledge is a competency require-
ment, not a corroboration requirement.). Present sense impressions also have been 
held not to be cumulative evidence. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 1"61 
S.W.2d 474 (1942); Waltz, supra note 39, at 880-81. Finally, statements in the form 
of opinions have been held admissible because PSI's are not statements of reflective 
thought and therefore do not run afoul of the opinion rule. MORGAN, supra note 
24, at 301; Waltz, supra note 39, at 881-82; see FED. R. EVID. 701; see also C. 
MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 10 (expressions found to be made from conjecture are 
inadmissible). 
42. See, e.g., In Re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub. nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
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Corroboration of the event is a requirement that evidence, other 
than just the statement, be offered in court to verify the existence of the 
event and to counteract the possibility of the declarant making a "calcu-
lated misrepresentation" or a "simple misobservation" as to the event.43 
Courts that require corroboration of the event disagree as to the degree 
of corroboration that is required: corroboration by an equally percipient 
witness, or corroboration by some other evidence.44 
An equally percipient witness is one who observes the same event 
from the same vantage point as the declarant.4s The equally percipient 
witness requirement has been traced to the works of Thayer and Morgan 
and the Houston Oxygen case.46 These authorities appear to justify this 
requirement because the witness will usually be in a position to perceive 
the event or condition in question along with the utterance made by the 
declarant.47 Thus, the witness can verify the event the declarant 
perceived. 
Many commentators have not supported the equally percipient wit-
ness requirement because they view it as an overly restrictive limitation 
on the PSI exception that does not boost trustworthiness significantly.48 
Some of these authorities, however, do require corroboration of the 
event, but allow any type of evidence to corroborate the event, including 
an equally percipient witness.49 Allowing any type of evidence to corrob-
(1986); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1978); United 
States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Robinson v. Shapiro, 484 
F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 646 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1981); State v. 
Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979); Jones v. State, 65 Md. App. 121,499 A.2d 
511 (1985), rev'd, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987); Booth v. State, 62 Md. App. 26, 
488 A.2d 195 (1985), aff'd, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986); Commonwealth v. 
Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974). 
Some courts have added confusion to the debate over corroboration of the 
event by referring to corroboration generically. The term "corroboration," how-
ever, is important in a number of contexts when determining the admissibility of 
PSI's. Corroboration may be necessary to verify anyone of the following require-
ments for admissibility: (1) the declarant's firsthand knowledge, (2) the contempo-
raneity between the event and the declarant's statement, (3) that the event was not 
fabricated or misobserved by the declarant, or (4) that the witness is truthfully re-
counting the declarant's statement. Therefore, when a court uses the term "corrob-
oration" in connection with PSI's it must clearly state to which requirement for 
admissibility the corroboration pertains. See infra cases cited in notes 49, 50. 
43. Waltz, supra note 39, at 891. 
44. See Note, supra note 40, at 199 (other witnesses' perceptions can be probative as to 
the occurrence of the event and such evidence can come from another witness or 
circumstantial evidence). 
45. Coleman, 458 Pa. at 119, 326 A.2d at 390. 
46. Waltz, supra note 39, at 883-84, 892-95. 
47. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 477 (1942); Morgan, 
supra note 24, at 236; Thayer, supra note 21, 15 AM. L. REV. at 107. 
48. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 298, at 862-63; Comment, supra note 39, at 
673-74; Note, supra note 42, at 67. 
49. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3rd Cir. 1983) rev'd on other grounds 
sub. nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ("the 
rule is generally understood to require that ... there must be some corroborating 
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orate the event is the most desirable approach because it bolsters signifi-
cantly the trustworthiness of the PSI without the harsh stricture of the 
equally percipient witness requirement. 
Some courts, however, have not required any evidence to corrobo-
rate the event, but have allowed such evidence to bolster the credibility of 
the witness. 50 These courts have attempted to justify this position by 
relying on cases that discredit the equally percipient witness require-
ment. 51 This reliance is ill-founded because the thrust of the arguments 
are not against corroborative evidence per se, but against the strict re-
quirement of the equally percipient witness. 52 For example, in State v. 
Flesher,53 the Supreme Court of Iowa held that statements made to a 
witness over the phone were admissible as PSI'S.54 The court also held 
that the statements did not require corroboration of the event as a condi-
tion of admissibility. 55 
One commentator questions the result in Flesher and the court's 
treatment of the PSI exception. 56 The commentator suggests that the 
court's conclusion was based on the rejection of the equally percipient 
witness requirement, not on the rejection of the requirement of corrobo-
testimony"); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1979) (the court 
held that witnesses need not be in an equal position to the declarant to corroborate 
the event); Robinson v. Shapiro, 484 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the court did 
not reject the corroboration factor); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 288 
(E.D. Mich. 1977); State v. Savant, 146 Ariz. 306, 705 P.2d 1357 (1985) ("quick 
corroboration of statement reduced risk of falsification"); Jones v. State, 65 Md. 
App. 121, 126,499 A.2d 511,513 (1985), rev'd, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987); 
Booth v. State, 62 Md. App. 26, 36, 488 A.2d 195, 200, aff'd, 306 Md. 313, 508 
A.2d 876 (1986) (hearing events through phone was sufficiently corroborating); 
State v. Perry, 95 N.M. 179, 179-81,619 P.2d 855, 855-57 (1980); Commonwealth 
v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 119, 326 A.2d 387, 390 (1974) (inability of witness to 
actually observe event does not make the exception inapplicable); Commonwealth v. 
Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super. 201, 219, 494 A.2d 426, 435 (1985) (interpreting and 
agreeing with Coleman that the witness' corroboration of the event is critical to the 
admission of a PSI); see Waltz, supra note 39, at 889-97; Comment, supra note 39, at 
674; Comment, supra note 40, at 439-40. 
50. See State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 1979) (corroboration of the event 
goes to the weight, not admissibility); see also United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. 
Supp. 329, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (federal rules do not require corroboration for the 
PSI). 
51. See State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). In Flesher the court 
held that no corroboration of the event was necessary for the admissibility of PSI's. 
Id. at 218. The Flesher court relied on a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. 
Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 114, 326 A.2d 387, 390 (1974), that held that "verification" 
was not a requirement for admissibility. There is a strong argument, however, that 
"verification" meant corroboration by an equally percipient witness. Id. (witness 
was able to give corroborating testimony as evidence of the event); cf C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 9, § 298, at 862-63 (indicating that McCormick would excise the 
equally percipient witness requirement, but not all corroborative evidence). 
52. See supra note 49. 
53. 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979). 
54. Id. at 218. 
55.Id. 
56. See Note, supra note 40. 
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ration of the event in question. 57 The commentator also theorizes that 
PSI's which are void of any corroborative evidence of the event offer no 
assurance that the declarants actually perceived anything. 58 Therefore, 
such statements are unacceptable as PSI's because there is no check 
against fabrication. Another criticism of Flesher is the court's reliance 
on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) as support for its holding. In 
Flesher, the court referred to the wording and underlying rationale of 
Rule 803(1) as support for holding that no corroboration of the event is 
required for the admission of PSI's. 59 Although the text of Federal Rule 
803(1) does not mention corroboration,60 the advisory committee note 
indicates that evidence of the event or condition is an important factor in 
evaluating the credibility of the PSI. 61 
Four years after the Supreme Court of Iowa decided Flesher, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in In re Japa-
nese Electronic Products,62 that PSI's under Rule 803(1) require some 
evidence or testimony corroborating the event.63 The court recognized 
that while the contemporaneity between the statement and the event does 
"provide some guarantee against misrepresentation and defective mem-
ory ... this guarantee is not considered totally reliable .... "64 Based on 
this reasoning, the court held that the documents in question, minutes of 
a meeting, were inadmissible evidence because the events described in the 
57. Id. at 191. 
58. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
59. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d at 218. In the court of appeals decision the court held that no 
corroboration was required for the admission of PSI's and the court relied on Com-
monwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974), to support its holding. 
Flesher, 286 N.W.2d at 220. 
60. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note. 
61. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The advisory committee note cites 
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 340-41 (1962) on the underlying theory 
of the rule ("the witness ... may be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in 
evaluating the statement"). FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note. In the 
court of appeals decision, the court relied on the Coleman case. The Coleman case, 
however, does not stand for the proposition that corroboration is unnecessary, 
rather it holds that the heightened requirement of an equally percipient witness is 
not justified. See supra note 51 (referring to Coleman); see also Note, supra note 40, 
at 188-89. 
62. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see People v. Watson, 100 
A.D.2d 452, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1984). 
63. In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d at 303. 
64. Id. But cf United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 322-23 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (court admitted witness' testimony as a PSI; declarant made statement to 
witness about a phone conversation that witness did not hear, but witness saw de-
clarant hang up phone; court held that fabrication in this circumstance was un-
likely). This case could be interpreted as not requiring "corroboration" of the event. 
The court, however, did not explicitly reject corroboration of the event. Further-
more, the fact that the witness saw the declarant on the phone is arguably evidence 
that the declarant was speaking to someone and thus there was some corroboration 
of the event. 
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documents were not corroborated. 65 
Until recently, Maryland courts have not addressed the viability of 
the PSI exception66 because the courts have dealt with such spontaneous 
declarations by applying the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.61 
The res gestae exception, however, proved to be an unreliable test for the 
admission of hearsay evidence.68 The waning satisfaction with the res 
65. Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d at 303 (documents allegedly were minutes of a 
meeting). 
66. Jones v. State, 65 Md. App. 121,499 A.2d 511 (1985), rev'd, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 
169 (1987); Booth v. State, 62 Md. App. 26,488 A.2d 195 (1985), aff'd, 306 Md. 
313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986). The intermediate court in Booth recognized that the 
present sense impression exception has four factors justifying its admission: (1) a 
contemporaneous statement is safe from memory defects; (2) the contemporaneity 
requirement obviates concern of calculated misstatements; (3) the statement is usu-
ally made to another person in a position to perceive the same events and therefore 
provide corroboration; and (4) if the declarant is available to testify he can be cross-
examined as to his credibility. Booth, 62 Md. App. at 35-36, 488 A.2d at 200. The 
court of special appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling because it found that the 
contemporaneity and corroboration factors were satisfied. [d. at 36-37, 488 A.2d at 
200-01. The Jones court followed the formulations delineated in the intermediate 
Booth case for the admission of present sense impressions. Jones, 65 Md. App. at 
125-26, 499 A.2d at 513. Jones dealt with the testimony being offered by a state 
trooper as to the content of a citizens band conversation between two truck drivers. 
The court, applying the Booth factors, found that because the statements were not 
made to the trooper and neither driver was available to testify, the only area of 
examination was the trooper's memory of what he supposedly heard. This could 
not satisfy the third factor delineated in Booth, corroboration of the events the 
driver spoke of, and therefore the testimony was held inadmissible. [d. 
After the court of appeals decided the Booth case, the court granted certiorari 
to hear the Jones case. In Jones, the court of appeals reversed the court of special 
appeals by holding that PSI's between two drivers, who were unidentified, were 
admissible through a state trooper who overheard the statements on a citizens band 
radio. The appellee in the case, Jones, argued that the PSI's were inadmissible be-
cause there was no corroboration showing that the witness was not fabricating the 
statements. Jones, 311 Md. at 31-32,532 A.2d at 173. The court held that corrobo-
ration of the witness' testimony was unnecessary because the oath and cross exami-
nation is sufficient to "safeguard against lying." [d. The court also reaffirmed its 
holding in Booth that corroboration by an equally percipient witness is unnecessary 
for the admission of PSI's. [d. Finally, the court stated, in dicta, that "the inherent 
trustworthiness of a statement of perception given contemporaneously with the 
event being described is sufficient to outweigh [the concern of] the possibility of 
fabrication by unknown declarants." [d. The court's position is unclear, however, 
as to whether the court intended to say that "unknown" declarants do not hamper 
admissibility of PSI's because the justification for admitting PSI's is spontaneity, not 
the declarant's inherent credibility, or whether the court intended to say that the 
danger of fabrication by the declarant may be present because he is unknown, but 
that such was not sufficient to make the PSI inadmissible. Whichever the case, the 
court apparently did not close the book on the question of whether any corrobora-
tion of the event is necessary for the admission of a PSI. Furthermore, it would 
have been unnecessary to decide the issue in Jones because there was evidence to 
corroborate the statements and, moreover, it was not raised on appeal. [d. at 27,31-
32, 532 A.2d at 171,173. 
67. Wright v. State, 88 Md. 705,41 A. 1060 (1898); see Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 
452 A.2d 661 (1982). 
68. L. McLAIN, supra note 9, § 803(1).1; J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1767, at 255; 
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gestae exception led to the gradual overhaul of this outdated mechanism 
for admitting "spontaneous" hearsay statements.69 Consequently, more 
clearly defined divisions of spontaneous declarations, such as excited ut-
terances and PSI's, were adopted to create more accurate classifications 
of admissible hearsay.7o 
In Booth v. State,71 the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the 
PSI exception to the hearsay rule in the form that it appears in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(1).72 After reviewing the authorities who have 
commented on the PSI, the court concluded that the PSI is an acceptable 
exception to the hearsay rule because such statements are trustworthy.73 
The court also reasoned that the similarities between PSI's and excited 
utterances, spontaneous statements already recognized as exceptions to 
hearsay in Maryland, further justified the adoption of the PSI 
exception. 74 
The court also discussed the practical problems that may arise from 
the application of the PSI exception.7s The court acknowledged four 
such problems: (1) whether, and to what degree, the statement and the 
event must be contemporaneous,76 (2) whether the declarant must have 
Thayer, supra note 21, 15 AM. L. REV. at 10 (a rule that collected some things that 
belonged and some that did not). 
69. See Mouzone, 294 Md. 692, 452 A.2d 661; Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248, 131 
A.2d 737 (1957); Neusbaum v. State, 156 Md. 149, 143 A. 872 (1928); Gray v. State, 
53 Md. App. 699, 456 A.2d 1290 (1983); Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 338 
A.2d 344, cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975); Hall v. State,S Md. App. 599, 249 A.2d 
217 (1969). In Mouzone, Grier, Neusbaum, Moore, and Hall the courts firmly recog-
nized the excited utterance exception as a division of the res gestae concept. 
70. The four types of spontaneous declarations are: present bodily conditions, present 
mental states, excited utterances and present sense impressions. See Booth, 62 Md. 
App. at 32, 488 A.2d at 198-99; Morgan, supra note 24. 
71. 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986). 
72. Booth v. State, 306 Md. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981. 
73. Id. at 317-24, 508 A.2d at 977-81. 
74. Id. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981 (underlying rationale of both exceptions is to "preserve 
the benefit of spontaneity in the narrow span of time before a declarant has an op-
portunity to reflect and fabricate"). 
75.Id. 
76. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text. A problem with the Booth decision 
lies in the court's application of the PSI criteria. The first statement made by the 
declarant was in response to the witness' question of who was in the declarant's 
house with him. See supra note 4. The declarant responded that a girl, "Brenda" 
was in the house with him. This statement should not have been admitted under the 
PSI exception because it violates the contemporaneity requirement between the 
statement and event. See supra notes 23-24, 28-31 and accompanying text. In 
Booth, the declarant was responding to a question asked about a continuing condi-
tion that had existed for an indefinite period of time. For a decision holding that a 
PSI can be in response to a question see State v. Barnes, 124 Ariz. 586, 606 P.2d 802 
(1980). Two decisions have held that the absence of a known time period in which 
to judge the possibility of a misstatement by the declarant will render the evidence 
inadmissible because the contemporaneity requirement is not satisfied. Common-
wealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 313, 513 A.2d 373, 380 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 962 (1987); Reichman v. Wallach, 306 Pa. Super. 177, 194-95,452 A.2d 501, 
510 (1982). Contra United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Starr 
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personal knowledge of the event or condition,77 (3) whether the declarant 
must be identified,78 and (4) whether statements in the form of opinions 
are admissible.79 
In addressing the contemporaneity issue, the court noted that some 
time lapse between the event and the statement is allowable as long as the 
circumstances do not give time for the declarant to speak from reflective 
thought.80 The court also stated that the declarant must have firsthand 
knowledge of the event,8l but that the identification of the declarant is 
not a condition of admissibility of the statement.82 Additionally, the 
court stated that PSI's in the form of opinions are admissible because 
such statements are not reflective, and therefore do not violate the opin-
ion rule.83 
The Booth court also responded to the appellant's contention that, 
in order for PSI's to be admissible, the PSI must be corroborated by an 
equally percipient witness. 84 The court flatly rejected corroboration by 
an equally percipient witness as a requirement for admissibility.85 While 
providing no direct reasoning,86 the court apparently based its holding on 
two grounds. First, the court recognized that Rule 803(1) does not, on 
its face, require corroboration.87 Second, the court made reference to the 
writings of Waltz and McCormick, two prominent evidence authorities, 
v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d 183 (N.D. 1975). The facts in Booth make it impossible to 
know whether the declarant was responding to an event or condition at the time he 
first perceived it, or whether the event or condition had existed for a long period of 
time, thereby giving the declarant ample time to make a calculated misstatement. 
The lack of knowledge of the time lapse between the statement and event causes the 
statement to fail the contemporaneity factor of the exception. Even though strict 
contemporaneity is not required, the court must know the length of the time lapse 
and the nature of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the 
declarant had time to fabricate his statement. See Peterkin, 511 Pa. at 313,513 A.2d 
at 380; Reichman, 306 Pa. Super. at 194-95,452 A.2d at 510. The first statement in 
Booth, therefore, falls outside the scope of the PSI exception because it fails to sat-
isfy the contemporaneity requirement which destroys its trustworthiness. See 
Booth, 306 Md. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981; Waltz, supra note 39, at 880; Comment, 
supra note 39. 
77. Booth, 306 Md. at 324-25, 508 A.2d at 981. 
78. Id. at 325, 508 A.2d at 981-82. 
79. Id. at 325-27, 508 A.2d at 982-83. 
80. Id. at 324, 508 A.2d at 981. 
81. Id. at 324-25, 508 A.2d at 981-82. Personal knowledge is a threshold requirement 
of admissibility because it concerns the competency of the declarant, not proof of 
the event. 
82. Id. at 325, 508 A.2d at 981; see State v. Jones, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987) 
(PSI by unidentified declarants held admissible). 
83. Id. at 325-27, 508 A.2d at 982-83 (citing MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE 
AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE ch. 13, at 300 (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976) and Waltz, The 
Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attrib-
utes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 881-82 (1981); see supra note 41 (opinion rule excludes 
statements made from conjecture). 
84. Booth, 306 Md. at 317, 327-30, 508 A.2d at 977,983-84. 
85. Id. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. at 327, 508 A.2d at 983. 
170 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
that denounce the equally percipient witness requirement. 88 
Although clearly rejecting corroboration by an equally percipient 
witness, the court was confusing in its discussion of corroboration in 
general: 
As we have noted, extrinsic evidence may sometimes be re-
quired to demonstrate the contemporaneity of the statement, or 
to show that it is the product of personal perception by the 
declarant. Accordingly, it may be correct in a particular case 
to say that "corroboration" is required, but this does not mean 
that corroboration is required in every instance, or that the cor-
roborationmust be that of an equally percipient witness. Even 
when not required for admissibility, corroboration (or the lack 
thereof) may be important in determining the weight to be 
given the statement. 89 
In conclusion, the court held that the statements in question were prop-
erly admitted under the PSI exception because both the firsthand knowl-
edge and contemporaneity requirements were satisfied by the witness' 
perception of the event.90 
The Booth decision makes great strides toward improving the func-
tionallaw of evidence in Maryland courts by recognizing the PSI excep-
tion and by limiting the scope of the res gestae exception.91 The court 
was warranted in giving guidance on the "practical problems" it realized 
would follow the acceptance of the exception.92 In dealing with these 
considerations the court followed the relevant case law and the advice of 
the commentators.93 The court was further warranted in rejecting the 
equally percipient witness requirement because it is an overly restrictive 
limitation on the admission of PSI'S.94 
Unfortunately, after the court rejected the equally percipient witness 
requirement, the court made an ambiguous statement regarding how cor-
roboration in general applies to the PSI exception.95 The court stated 
that "[i]t may be correct in a particular case to say that 'corroboration' is 
required, but this does not mean that corroboration is required in every 
instance. . . . "96 This statement is ambiguous because it is unclear 
whether it applies to corroboration of the existence of the event or to 
corroboration of the firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity 
requirements. 
88. [d. at 328-30, 508 A.2d at 983-84. 
89. [d. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984. 
90. [d. at 331, 508 A.2d at 985. The court also indicated that a lack of evidence to the 
contrary was important. [d. 
91. See supra notes 21-23, 67-69 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 39-48, 80-83 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
96. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 330, 508 A.2d 976, 984 (1986). 
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This statement may be referring to corroboration of the event be-
cause the sentence preceding the ambiguous statement addresses corrob-
oration by an equally percipient witness, which generally applies to 
corroboration of the event.97 Furthermore, the court quoted an author-
ity that indicated that corroboration of the event is an unnecessary re-
quirement.98 On the other hand, the statement may be referring only to 
corroboration of the firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity require-
ments. This interpretation is supported by three reasons. First, the 
court's statement about firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity di-
rectly precedes the statement.99 Second, although the equally percipient 
witness requirement usually applies to corroboration of the event,IOO the 
court's failure to label specifically what the equally percipient witness' 
testimony in the first sentence was intended to corroborate implies that it 
pertains to the firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity requirements: 
the only requirements the court directly relates to corroboration. 101 
97. [d.; see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
98. Booth, 306 Md. at 329, 508 A.2d at 983-84 (citing C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 298, at 862-63 (3d ed. 1984)). McCormick states that a require-
ment of corroboration of circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of PSI's is 
unnecessary for admissibility for two reasons. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 298. 
One reason is that only one hearsay exception specifically requires corroboration. 
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The other reason is that although corroboration by 
the witness is usually present and is one of the justifications for the exceptions, that 
does not translate into a requirement for admissibility. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 
9, § 298. 
99. Booth, 306 Md. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984. 
100. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
101. The court uses the term corroboration throughout its discussion on the equally 
percipient witness requirement but fails to adequately explain what is being corrobo-
rated. Booth, 306 Md. at 327-30, 508 A.2d 983-84; see infra note 102. The firsthand 
knowledge requirement is necessary to show that the witness is competent to testify. 
See supra note 10 (perception); see also Ramratton v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. 
Supp. 522, 528 (D. Md. 1987) ("[a]lthough corroboration is not required under 
803(1), the fact that the declarant probably observed the event - or was in a position 
to do so - is advanced as one of the reasons present sense impressions are trustwor-
thy"). The contemporaneity requirement removes the opportunity for the declarant 
to fabricate the story. See supra note 10 (sincerity). 
The problems created by ignoring the corroboration factor entirely can best be 
illustrated by an example. Suppose two people are seated in a room with one win-
dow and person A has his back to the window while person B faces it. B is looking 
out the window while A is reading a book. B casually states to A: "Your girlfriend 
is driving by the house with another man in a red convertible." On the surface this 
appears to be a good PSI because it appears to meet the contemporaneity and first-
hand knowledge requirements. There is, however, no information to corroborate 
the event. B may have simply made up the entire statement and yet it appears to 
satisfy the contemporaneity requirement. The difficulty with accepting this logic is 
that without any evidence that the event actually occurred, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the declarant had firsthand knowledge of the event or to determine 
whether the statement was contemporaneous with the event. If, on the other hand, 
A heard a car going by at the time, or another person saw a red convertible going 
down the street at that time from another vantage point, the firsthand knowledge 
and contemporaneity factors become meaningful because we know B perceived an 
event about which he made his statement. 
172 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
Third, the discussion of corroboration concluded with a reference to the 
equally percipient witness; when considered in conjunction with the first 
reason, this further implies that the court was addressing corroboration 
of firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity by an equally percipient 
witness. 102 
If the court intended the statement to apply to the corroboration of 
the event requirement, the court's position is ill-advised. The court 
offered no direct authority to support this conclusion, \03 and although 
reference is made to cases and commentaries that reject the equally 
percipient witness requirement,I04 these sources do not support a total 
rejection of the corroboration of the event requirement. lOS Moreover, 
the only authority mentioned by the court that specifically states that 
corroboration of the event is unnecessary, State v. Flesher,106 was appar-
ently cited only to support the rejection of the equally percipient witness 
requirement. 107 
The Booth court, as the Flesher court did, misinterpreted Rule 
803(1) as it applies to the corroboration of the event requirement. Both 
opinions state that because Rule 803(1) does not directly require corrob-
orative evidence, no such evidence is necessary for the admission of 
PSI'S.108 Reliance on this argument is weak, however, because the advi-
sory committee note to the rule states that one of the justifications behind 
the admission of PSI's is that some evidence of the event will be available 
as a check against fabrication. I09 Furthermore, the Booth court failed to 
recognize the importance of two recent decisions that have held that 
PSI's are inadmissible without some kind of corroborative evidence. 110 
One of the decisions, In re Japanese Electronic Products, III was a federal 
appellate court decision applying the federal rule on the PSI.112 This 
102. Booth, 306 Md. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984. 
103. See id. The court does, however, make reference to the fact that the federal rules do 
not directly require corroboration of the event, but it js unclear whether the court 
was discussing all corroboration or just corroboration by an equally percipient wit-
ness. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
104. Booth, 306 Md. at 327-29, 508 A.2d at 983-84. 
105. The requirement of one type of corroboration does not necessarily make up for the 
failure to require corroboration of another type. Therefore, the conclusion that no 
corroboration of the event is required merely because the equally percipient witness 
requirement has been rejected has been criticized by commentators. See Note, supra 
note 40, at 189 (discussing Coleman). 
106. 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979); see supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
107. Booth, 306 Md. at 328, 508 A.2d at 983. 
108. See State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d at 218; Booth, 306 Md. at 327, 508 A.2d at 983. 
109. See L. McLAIN, supra note 9, § 803(1).2, at 348-49; Waltz, supra note 39, at 890-92; 
Note, supra note 40, at 185-86. 
110. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 
sub. nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); 
People v. Watson, 100 A.D.2d 452, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1984); see also supra note 47 
and accompanying text. 
111. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
112. Id. at 303; see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
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decision is highly persuasive as to the corroboration of the event require-
ment because the Booth court adopted the PSI exception "in the form in 
which it appears in" Rule 803(1).113 
Conversely, if the Booth court did not intend the statement to refer 
to the corroboration of the event requirement, the court must have in-
tended that the statement only pertain to the firsthand knowledge and 
contemporaneity requirements. This interpretation presents the better 
view because it further clarifies the court's position on those require-
ments and leaves the issue of the corroboration of the event requirement 
an open question in Maryland. 114 When the issue is eventually brought 
before the court of appeals, the court should require that some corrobo-
ration of the event be offered for a PSI to be admitted into evidence. 
Such a holding would be consistent with the position of most courts and 
commentators, and the requirement will act as a safeguard against a de-
clarant's misobservation or outright fabrication of the event. 
In Booth v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule as it now exists in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1). The court further held that corrobora-
tion by equally percipient witnesses is not a requirement for admissibil-
ity. Unfortunately, the court also made an ambiguous statement that 
"corroboration" is not a requirement for a PSI to be admissible. This 
position, as applied to the corroboration of the event requirement, would 
be both unwarranted and unwise according to most courts and commen-
tators because it does not provide adequate safeguards against a declar-
ant's misobservation or outright fabrication of the event. It is more 
likely, however, that the court intended the statement to apply only to 
the firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity requirements. In the fu-
ture, when the issue is raised, the court of appeals should require corrob-
oration of the event for the admission of PSI's; thus, only trustworthy 
PSI's will be admissible as substantive evidence. 
Jonathan Z. May 
113. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313,324, 508 A.2d 976, 981 (1986). Although the court 
cited both Japanese Electronic Products and Watson in its discussion on the equally 
percipient witness requirement, the Booth court only mentioned the refusal of those 
courts to admit PSI's without corroboration in passing. See Id., 306 Md. at 328, 
508 A.2d at 983. 
114. The only other case from the court of appeals addressing the PSI exception was 
decided after Booth. Jones v. State, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987). Although the 
Jones court discussed "corroboration," the discussion was about yet another type of 
corroboration, corroboration showing that a witness is not fabricating the statements 
to which he is testifying. Jones, 311 Md. at 31-32, 532 A.2d at 173. The Jones court 
held that this type of corroboration is unnecessary. Id. The Jones decision supports 
the interpretation that Booth applies only to the firsthand knowledge and contempo-
raneity requirements because Jones mentions Booth only in that capacity. Id. 
Moreover, Jones specifically applies only to the corroboration of the witness require-
ment and, therefore, it is logical that the Booth court would have limited its discus-
sion on corroboration to the firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity 
requirements. Id. 
